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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a case of a failed business relationship between a former Eagle developer and a 
Boise restauranteur. The sole owner and managing member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, 
("Mosell Equities" or "Plaintiff'), Glenn E. Mosell ("Mosell"), was the developer of a proposed 
development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as "Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 160, L. 21 ). 1 In the summer of 2005, Mosell approached John Berryhill ("Berryhill"), the 
sole shareholder and president of Berryhill & Company, Inc. ("Berryhill & Company" or 
"Defendant"), about opening a restaurant within the development. Mosel! Equities then began 
paying Berryhill as a consultant on the Polo Cove development. Ultimately, however, Mosell 
discussed a different relationship between them, which would allow Berryhill to participate in 
Polo Cove profits beyond daily restaurant operations. The parties agreed to "blend" certain of 
their activities and form a new entity called MoBerry Ventures. or similar names. Berryhill & 
Company would contribute its name, restaurant operations and expertise and Mosell Equities 
would contribute cash to buy into the new combined entity. 
Corporate documents for a MoBerry entity went through some drafts with attorneys, but 
were never finalized or executed. Nevertheless, on approximately June 28, 2007, Mosell 
Equities made its first cash contribution. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check, signed by 
John Berryhill and Glenn Mosell (referred to as Exhibit 1), there appears the following: 
Citations to the original Transcript in Mosell I are cited to "Tr." Citations to the 
Transcript provided in this subsequent appeal are cited to "Supp. Tr." 
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This is a loan from Mosel! Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses 
during our boo keeper [sic] transition. It will go into the general check register & 
be used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Benyhill & Co. l! 
will be transitioned into part of Glenn's '·buy in" of Mobeny Venture Corp. Inc. 
( emphasis added) 
Subsequently, Mosel! Equities made further contributions by check, some of which 
referenced the term "loan" and some of which did not. When Benyhill asked Mose II about the 
reference to a "loan," Mosell responded: "we have to call it something." Mosell later 
acknowledged that the "loan" was only an "interim substitute." The bulk of Mosell Equities' 
cash contribution went to tenant improvements at a new downtown Boise restaurant location, 
plus a later, large expansion at the same location, including a "Polo Cove" showroom. 
Mosell ultimately abandoned the Polo Cove development. Mosell Equities then brought 
this action based on several legal theories premised on the fact that there was a simple loan 
transaction between the pm1ies, nothing more. The jury found for Defendant Benyhill & 
Company on all these theories, including breach of contract, breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract and unjust enrichment.2 Later, the trial court3 granted Plaintiff's motion for JNOV on 
one element of the express contract claim, believing it should have instructed the jury that 
Exhibit 1 constituted a contract, but it would be up to a second jury to determine what the parties 
The jury found for Plaintiff on a count for conversion regarding a very small amount of 
furniture and awarded $2,016.85. The jury also found for Defendant John E. Benyhill 
individually on a fraud-in-the-inducement claim. 
The original judge on the case was the Honorable Darla S. Williamson ("the district 
court"). Subsequently, the Honorable Dennis E. Goff presided over the trial and post-trial 
motions ("the trial court"). 
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intended by it. This Court reversed that ruling and remanded for the trial court to consider the 
matter under the new trial standard. 
In granting Plaintiffs motion for new trial, instead of relying on factors to which this 
Court typically accords deference, such a credibility of witnesses, the trial com1 repeats a similar 
legal mistake to the one it made in its original decision granting JNOV. The trial court has now 
reinvented Plaintiff's case based on a theory of a very different express contract - one for a 
"buy-in" - than Plaintiff ever pied or argued. In fact, Plaintiff specifically disclaimed such a 
theory and its accompanying remedy. As demonstrated more fully below, for this and other 
reasons, unfortunately the trial court acted outside the boundaries of its discretion in ordering a 
new trial. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
1. Complaint filed May 28, 2009. 
2. Amended Complaint filed September 14, 2009. 
3. Motion to Dismiss granted on Count Six of Amended Complaint on 
December 4, 2009 (corporate veil piercing) (no claim left against 
Defendant Amy Berryhill). 
4. Jury Verdict on September 15, 2010, finding for Defendant Berryhill & 
Company on all counts except conversion; finding for Defendant John E. 
Berryhill on the fraud-in-the-inducement count). 
5. Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for JNOV on October 7, 2010. (JNOV 
granted on issue of contract formation, necessitating new trial on 
remaining elements of breach of express contract claim, according to the 
trial court). Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for JNOV filed October 26, 
2010, and related Order of Clarification filed November 23, 2010. 
Judgment filed January 10, 201 I. 
, 
-.)-
6. First Appeal filed on December 6, 2010 ('"rvfosell I''). 
7. Idaho Supreme Comi Opinion issued February 22, 2013 in Mosell I, 
reversing the Trial Court's grant of JNOV and remanding for 
consideration of new trial motion. 
8. Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial on July 11, 2013. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, as well as Order Granting New Trial 
filed on August 21, 2013. 
9. This second Appeal was filed timely on August 22, 2013, with an 
Amended Notice of Appeal filed on September 5, 2013. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This case arises from a failed business relationship.4 The sole owner and managing 
member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, Glenn E. Mosell, was the developer of a proposed 
development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as "Polo Cove." Mosell 
testified: 
There was a vineyard for sale around 2004 and 2005 that was listed, it was on the 
market, and a realtor show - took me out there, showed it to me. And it's in the 
Sunnyslope area of Canyon County. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 159, L. 9) 
So - I assembled a few pieces. And they referred to 290 acres or 300 acres was 
the original block. And I was looking to probably sub-divide it into five-acre 
little gentleman farms, little vineyards, and sub-divide and sell five-acre parcels. 
After a little while ... we decided to maybe propose a winery, or a wine country 
restaurant at that site. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21) 
Mosell had experience in the development field. He grew up in Southern California and 
graduated from UC San Diego in the early 1980s (Tr., Vol. I, p. 158, L. 9). He was an 
economics major and ultimately obtained his Series 6 license, working as an investment broker 
·
1 These facts were provided to this Court in Mosell I, but for ease of reference are repeated 
herein. 
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(Tr.. Vol. L p. 328. L. 1 ). Mosell moved to Boulder, Colorado. and started a development called 
Mill Village. Eventually, Mosell and his partner had a "difference of opinion in vision" and 
Mosell was bought out prior to any construction having begun (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L. 24). 
Mosell subsequently pursued a development in San Marcos that he ultimately walked 
away from and nothing was built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 332, L. 2). In Fredericksburg, Texas, Mosell put 
some land under contract intending to develop it and then decided not to go forward (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 332, L. 13). After moving to Idaho in 2000, Mosell became involved in a development known 
as Iron Horse in Cascade where disagreements arose and that development ended, nothing 
having been built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 334, L. 6). 
In July of 2005, Mosell approached the owner and President of Defendant Berryhill & 
Company, John Berryhill, initially about building a restaurant within the Polo Cove development 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21). Regarding the evolution of his relationship with Berryhill relative to 
his restaurant and Polo Cove, Mosell testified: 
I just called and left a message, introduced myself as a developer, asking if he was 
interested in building a wine country restaurant, and just left a message. (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 160, L. 25) 
I recognized that he [Berryhill] was a local chef with a following. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
161, L. 20). For Boise, he's fairly well-known. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 161, L. 24) 
He [Berryhill] expressed interest in being a part of the vin - vineyard venture. 
And so, I paid him, as a consult, to help design a restaurant, and how it would lay 
out on the hill, and I ultimately paid him $25,000 in consulting fees. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 166, L. 5) 
[BeITyhill could] offer insight, as a restaurateur, on how a restaurant might be 
designed, or how many tables in a certain area, or kitchen layout. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
175,L.9) 
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In addition to utilizing Berryhill' s knowledge and expertise in designing restaurants, 
Mosell intended to build a Berryhill & Company restaurant ("Berryhill Restaurant") within the 
Polo Cove development and intended that Berryhill would participate in the ultimate success of 
the project. 
I'm a partner in Polo Cove. So, ifl was a partner in a restaurant venture, then I 
can bring opportunities to that restaurant or add whatever skill set I might have, 
you know and that - that comes with a real estate background. And so, we looked 
at the opportunities even in downtown Boise; all right? But if I was a part of a 
restaurant, half owner of a restaurant, then maybe I would pursue opportunities 
where a restaurant would be an amenity to the project. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 171, L. 3) 
*** 
I paid John Berryhill $25,000 for consulting work, to work toward design of a 
restaurant at Polo Cove. When we agreed on the buy-in - or the sale of half of his 
company to me, at that point the consulting fee wasn't appropriate. He would be 
working toward a common goal of opportunity at Polo Cove, and so [ sic l (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 241, L. 14; emphasis added) 
Mosell also acknowledged that the Berryhill name and reputation increased the value of 
the development. 
Q: Let me ask you about another one. Merely by him, meaning Berryhill, 
branding the restaurant, overseeing those operations, with really no need 
for him to invest his own monies in that real estate, he would enhance the 
value of the surrounding vineyard and uses. 
A: Correct. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 360, L. 6) 
Q: And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of 
the Berryhill name? 
A: Correct. 
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(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, Ll.14-16) 
Q: And is it fair to say that the PKF Consulting Group, in their feasibility 
study, indicated that Mr. Berryhill's strong and loyal following added or 
increased the feasibility of the overall development? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, LL 11-16; Defendant's Exhibit JJJ, p. 6) 
Mosell ordered Polo Cove business cards for Berryhill with the title of "Partner" (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 603, L. 6-16; Defendant's Exhibit N). Berryhill did not recall any other Polo Cove 
cards referring to partner (Tr., Vol. I, p. 605, L. 6). 
Mosell initially contemplated a small, wine-country development of 290 acres. Robert 
Taunton, a consultant for Polo Cove, testified as follows: 
At the time that I started working on the project [2007], the first phase of 
the Polo Cove overall project, which is roughly about 300 acres, was in 
public hearings in front of the Planning Commission out in Canyon 
County for a conditional use permit. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 6-10) 
And then, after that we started working on a larger scale planning project 
for the total property which was 1,600 acres. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 16) 
I thought that the initial development approval on the 300 acres, which 
was a winery, hotel, restaurant, education facility, and some residential in 
the - I the vines, really had a lot of merit and had potential in the 
marketplace. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 202, L. 11-15) 
The project more than quintupled, expanding from 290 acres to 1,600 acres. The Polo 
Cove Executive Overview was circulated to potential investors (Tr., Vol. I, p. 201, L. 9-18). The 
Executive Overview drafted on behalf of Plaintiff dated June 18, 2008 states that, in addition to 
the 290 original acres, it "secured and funded land options for approximately 1,100 acres 
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adjacent to the resort and winery parcel" (Defendant's Exhibit DDD, page 13). The Illustrative 
Map drafted by Plaintiff's architect (Ibid. page 16) shows that a charter school, education center, 
artisan center, interpretive center, winemakers lodge, fire stations, health and wellness center, 
sporting center, parks, storage barns, water reclamation facility, polo and event fields, an 
equestrian center and an amphitheater, were just some of the intended attractions. 
Berryhill testified regarding Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, reading from a portion as follows: 
For - for the new downtown location of his restaurant, John Berryhill has recently 
partnered with developer Glenn Mosel!. The two are also developing Polo Cove, 
a 1,600-acre living and resort community in the Snake River Valley Appalachian. 
A Berryhill's restaurant will anchor a boutique hotel, vineyard homes, a winery, 
spa, sporting club, and an equestrian center with polo fields. Catering and special 
events will be a primary focus, with vineyard weddings and receptions, festivals, 
concerts, and corporate events. Polo Cove is 30 minutes from Boise and is 
surrounded by 360 degree views of the Owyhee Mountains and the Boise 
Foothills. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 575, L. 15-p. 576, L. 1; Plaintiff's Exhibit 25) 
Steve Inch, owner of Propel Communications, with 25 years of marketing and brand 
development, was an independent contractor working with Mogul Development Group, in 
partnership with Mosell, and was hired to create a package to present to potential investors of 
Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. I, p. 853, L. 6). When asked about his understanding of the role of the 
Berryhill Restaurant with regard to a gourmet restaurant at Polo Cove, Mr. Inch stated: 
My understanding was that there was some type of partnership arrangement 
between Polo Cove development and Berryhill, and that Berryhill was the 
restaurant that would be a key draw to potential guests to the development itself, 
on - in the early stages. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 15) 
*** 
... [I]t was presented in a way, to me, that Berryhill is involved in this 
development, and that they were - the Berryhill name is an important part of the 
development itself. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 25) 
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Mr. Inch stated that the Berryhill name had a ·'pretty high equity" in terms of the local 
marketplace and explained that as follows: 
A: Well, we're- one of the things that is - is important to understand is, 
when you're creating a new development it's an-an issue of point of 
difference in the marketplace. What makes Polo Cove unique to another 
development that maybe have similar amenities? 
*** 
And my understanding is that - and I think rightly so - bringing on a name 
such as Berryhill, and that brand equity that exists in the marketplace, 
which means - there's brand equity and there's brand image, and they're 
very different. 
Q: When you - when you're talking about leveraging someone's brand 
equity, can you put that in layman's terms. 
A: Michael Jordan and Nike. If - whether or not Nike sells a shoe or not, 
they still pay for the value of the Michael Jordan name. This is similarly 
what I believe was done at Polo Cove. That without having anything other 
than the vineyards and the beautiful views, which are tremendous, 
Berryhill was something someone could touch, feel, taste, and realize as 
being in existence, thus adding credibility to the development. 
And the reality is, there's a-years of investment in that name and there's 
value in that. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 856, L. 10) 
Berryhill devoted substantial amounts of time to the Polo Cove venture, working with the 
original architects, running the architect group, coordinating the efforts of the web designer and 
art direction. During that whole time, Berryhill was trying to put Mosell's vision to paper, 
getting it developed to build (Tr., Vol. I, p. 680, L. 3; Defendant's Exhibit FFFF). Berryhill did 
so upon his understanding with Mosell, as Mosell testified above, that Berryhill would 
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participate in the Polo Cove profits beyond operation of the restaurant (Tr., Vol. I, p. 359, L. 21 -
p. 360, L. 5). 
At Mo sell' s urging, the Berryhill Restaurant moved to downtown Boise at the Plaza 121 
location. Mosell told Berryhill that they needed a sexy space, something better than a strip mall, 
where the Berryhill restaurant was previously located. And downtown has - is "sexy" (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 579, L. 23). They also needed a place to "wine and dine" investors and to show "the 
essence of what we were developing at Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580, L. 4). Berryhill testified 
that Mosell wanted a sexy place downtown: "I can't bring my clients that are going to invest a 
million dollars to an ugly strip mall behind a Firestone Tire Store. I need a sexy place so we can 
sell this, so we can sell you, so we can sell the Berryhill name" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 716, LL 13-19). 
Berryhill started the Berryhill Restaurant in March of 1998 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 427, L. 22). 
The restaurant was originally in the 8th Street Marketplace in downtown Boise, however it had to 
be relocated due to the demolition and reconstruction of BODO. Berryhill moved the restaurant 
to a strip mall on Broadway Avenue in Boise (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, L. 3). Berryhill wanted to 
eventually move downtown but testified as to why he agreed to move at that time as follows: 
I was fine in an ugly strip mall hidden behind a Firestone Tire store in what used 
to be a condom shop, doing wonderful. I had always loved downtown. I was 
downtown before, and I was in the Downtown Business Association before. Yes, 
I love downtown. I would love to go back to downtown. I did not go to 120 [sic] 
North Ninth Street because I wanted to be back downtown. I went there because 
your client [Mosell] and I, together, chose this sexy restaurant to spearhead Polo 
Cove. (Tr., Vol. L p. 476, L. 14) 
I - I didn't have a - I liked downtown, I enjoyed downtown, I enjoyed being a 
part of the OBA when I was down there previously. The First Thursdays that go 
on, there's a lot of activity that went on being downtown. I didn't have that being 
-10-
out on Broadway. However. I wasn't seeking space. I had no timeline or - I 
don't think I ever voiced, even in my head, that I ever wanted to go back 
downtown. I didn't have a - I didn't have a view of- or vision, or projection of 
going back downtown. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, LI. 8-17) 
When asked if it was Mosell' s idea to move the restaurant downtown, Berryhill 
responded: 
Absolutely ... He [Mosell] was meeting with investors that wanted to open a 
restaurant for a million dollars a key. He did not want to take them to a strip mall. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 477, L. 2) 
Berryhill further testified regarding Mosell's attempts to identify potential downtown 
restaurant locations: 
He [Mosell] started finding properties that - that originally you would have to 
build out and, I assume, use a builder. Properties like where the Spaghetti Factory 
is, used to be Louie's. And we went and looked at it, and he was talking about he 
had already found out that you could build, on top of it, condos and actually even 
go taller than the phone - I believe it's the phone company building beside it, to 
view - there was no variance, I believe was the term, that you couldn't build on 
top. That was - that was one .... He talked to commercial real estate brokers, 
another developer. We both met with Gary Christensen and Robert Kaylor of R. 
Grey, who started the R. Grey Lofts where the AppleOne building is, where 
AppleOne - or iPod, down at Eighth Street, to buy that space. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580, 
L. l 9-p.581, L. 15) 
Berryhill testified that Mosell took the lead in identifying a new downtown location 
because Berryhill was busy running his restaurant was not a real estate broker (Tr., Vol. I, p. 581, 
LL 18-23). 
Masell and Berryhill had previously hired an attorney, Kimbell Gourley, in relation to a 
purchase and sale contract for the purchase of a strip mall on Broadway A venue in Boise (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 826, L. 16). They met with Mr. Gourley again on March 6, 2007 to discuss the 
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proposed formation of a new corporation to be known as MoBeITy Corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley's understanding was that Berryhill and Mosell were to become 
shareholders of this new corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley subsequently sent 
drafts of the documents to the parties, leaving blanks because the parties had not resolved 
everything. When asked if it was his understanding that the transaction was going to take the 
form of a loan from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company, Mr. Gourley responded: 
The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood 
that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it 
would be inconsistent with - with a capital contribution into a corporation. And 
so, I - nobody discussed that with me. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 829, L. 19) 
The lease for the new downtown restaurant space at Plaza 121 was signed on April 12, 
2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 681, L. 9; Plaintiffs Exhibit FFFF); both Mosell and BeITyhill signed the 
Personal Guaranty for the lease (Tr., Vol. I, p. 885, L. 3; Plaintiffs Exhibit G). On June 28, 
2007 (approximately two months after the lease was signed), Mosell wrote a check to Berryhill 
& Company for $50,000. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check is the following notation: 
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses 
during our bookkeeper transition. It will go into the general check register & be 
used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. 
It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of MoBeITy Venture Corp. Inc. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 147, L. 13; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 [emphasis added]) 
The parties had never discussed loans and when Berryhill was asked what he understood 
the money to be, he testified, "Well, I never understood it to be a loan. We never discussed it as 
a loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 441, L. 19). BeITyhill further testified: 
At the - at that time. I had - I saw nothing wrong with it because Glenn and I 
never discussed this money that he paid as a loan .... The word loan never came 
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up until I saw that he wrote on the check. And I asked, we're doing this thing, 
this is not a loan, why are you writing a loan? And he said we have to classify it 
as something. (Tr.. Vol. I. p. 443. L. 12-19) 
I believe my original testimony was that that word is a loan, and it was given to 
me by [Mosell], and - however, I did not have, at the time, an issue with it, 
because I turned and asked him, is - and I'm actually referring to the loan on the 
check, not the loan that I wrote below - and I asked him, well, this is not a loan. 
And he said, we have to call it something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23) 
I understood Glenn to say that it was not a loan, but we had to call it something, 
so we could put it on the books and just park it so it would have - it wouldn't 
have to move until we signed the documents, and put in on a specific tax year. It 
could sit there. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 788, L. 16) 
From June 28, 2007 to April 30, 2008, Mosell wrote checks totaling $405,000 (Plaintiffs 
Exhibits 2-11.) When asked ifhe noticed that some, but not all, of the checks have the word loan 
written in the memo line, Berryhill testified that he did not see all of the checks until the lawsuit, 
due to the fact that the checks went to his general manager at the time (Tr., Vol. I, p. 590, L. 25-
p. 591, L. 9). 
When asked if he thought it was a loan, Berryhill testified: 
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I 
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never 
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term 
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter- interim substitute. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 587, L. 4-9) 
Berryhill also testified that there was no doubt in his mind, at that time, that the transition 
would occur (Tr., Vol. I, p. 586, L. 22). 
Although Mosell had an economics degree and extensive real estate and financial 
experience, he never presented Berryhill with a note or any other documents relating to any 
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purported "loan'' (Tr.. Vol. L p. 593. L. 21). For his part, Berryhill testified that he has no legal 
or accounting training (Tr., Vol. L p. 585, L. 9-13). 
The parties never signed the documents drafted by Mr. Gourley. In December, 2007, the 
parties met with Amy Dempsey, a CPA with the firm Riche, Dempsey & Associates, Chartered. 
The parties told Ms. Dempsey that they had some joint business proceedings dealing with a 
development called Polo Cove and that the expertise of both parties was required to put the 
project together. She understood that the name-brand of Berryhill & Company would be an 
anchor to the development and a draw for people who were going to be buying into Polo Cove as 
well as staying there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 792, L. 11 ). The parties further explained that the move from 
the strip mall to downtown would bump up the image of Berryhill & Company. The parties 
would also have a front for Polo Cove where people walking downtown could obtain information 
on Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. I, p. 793, L. 19). 
Ms. Dempsey testified that the parties had several meetings to try to put something 
together to understand the end goal of the parties, of what exactly was taking place (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
794. L. 1 ). When asked if she understood after several meetings what the parties were trying to 
achieve, Ms. Dempsey replied, "I do not." She stated the reason was "Because I could never get 
a straight answer, from either Glenn or John, on what we would put together, if that is exactly 
what they were trying to achieve" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 794, L. 17). 
Ms. Dempsey further testified that she understood there were funds from Mosell being 
deposited into the Berryhill Restaurant account. When asked what understanding she gained 
from her meetings with Mosell regarding those funds, Ms. Dempsey replied: 
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There \Vas no clear definition of what the monies were for because there was a lot 
of activity that was going on from - where John was working out of the 
Broadway location to moving downtown. There was a lot of expenses being 
incurred to move forward this idea of Polo Cove. 
So, these monies going in - at one point in time, we just didn't have an 
explanation for it. And that is why we had meetings and trying to define it as 
well as meetings with attorneys to get documents signed, because nothing was 
ever clearly defined by the two parties of what exactly those monies were for. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, LL 3-14). 
When asked if she recalled asking Mosell that question, Ms. Dempsey replied that Mosell told 
her, ·'Well, just when we get there, we'll get there" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, L. 19). 
Ms. Dempsey further testified regarding any purported "loan:" 
Q. What did Mr. Mosell say to you, if anything, about the funds being a loan? 
A. Well, he never was really clear if it was a loan, or if it was compensation 
for John's services for consulting fees, or if it was reimbursement of build 
out for the Polo Cove space. There was nothing ever clearly defined. It 
would just change from one day to the next so to speak. 
Q. Did you ask John the same question? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you get any clear answer? 
A. No. 
Q. Who did you expect to answer that question? 
A. Well, I expected that Glenn would have an answer for me because it was 
him putting the money in, and because the money was kind of coming in 
piecemeal as they were moving towards their goal. It's not like it was one 
lump sum transferred in at one point in time. 
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Q. How was - how were those funds accounted for in the Berryhill & 
Company books? 
A. There were coded as what is termed a long-term liability. 
Q. And what did that signify. 
A. What that signified to me is that it was in a holding pattern until we had 
legal documentation to define how I was going to be able to treat those 
from an accounting standpoint. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, L 1 - p. 797, L. 2) 
Mosell never told Ms. Dempsey that the funds were considered a loan and never provided 
her with a copy of Exhibit 1 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 798, L. 1). Mosell testified that he considered the 
funds to be an "interim substitute" until his buy-in of MoBerry Venture Corp. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 321, 
L. 25- p. 323, L. 16). 
James Tomlinson, is in the commercial real estate business in Boise and is the head of a 
group of investors that own and operate the building located at Plaza 121 where Berryhill' s 
Restaurant moved in August 2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 881, L. 17-23). Mr. Tomlinson testified that 
when his company received a letter of intent from Berryhill, Inc. [sic] to rent the space at Plaza 
121, they questioned who the partners were and were told "the two of them" referring to 
Berryhill and Mosell (Tr., Vol. I, p. 884, L. 13-17). Mr. Tomlinson further testified: 
I didn't get a sense as to what - who owned the stock. Berryhill was a 
corporation, and - and I was told that these two folks owned it. And they both 
had agreed to sign a guarantee. And so, that was the limit to my investigation, I 
guess, of- Berryhill Company, so. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 894, LI. 15-20) 
*** 
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Obviously. I was told by them, because we then gave each of them a signature 
card authorizing us to investigate their background, and we asked each of them to 
sign a guarantee. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 895, LI. 3-6) 
Mr. Tomlinson also testified that a few months after Berryhill & Company's restaurant 
moved into Plaza 121, he was approached by Mosell and Berryhill regarding leasing additional 
space at Plaza 121. His understanding was that it would be used for Polo Cove. He admitted he 
was ·'lukewarm" and talked to one or both of the parties several times before finally agreeing to 
the expansion. There would be a retail storefront that would give exposure to the Polo Cove 
concept (Tr., Vol. I, p. 886, L. 21 - p. 887, L. 2). 
Mr. Tomlinson further testified that during one of his tours of the expansion space, 
Mosell was "waving his hands and talking about where computers would be located, and how 
they would be packed up and moved into a backroom in the evenings, so that the - the retail 
space could be converted to more of a lounge and - and a multi-use space." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 887, 
L. 20-24). 
When Berryhill was asked whose idea it was to lease the expansion space, he testified 
that it was Mosell' s. Berryhill further testified that he tried to put together various scenarios 
because he was concerned about the cost. However, Mosell advised Berryhill that he would fund 
the new banquet and ballroom and Polo Cove would fund the show room. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 626, L. 
12- p. 628, L. 25). Berryhill testified that Mosell wanted a showroom to showcase Polo Cove; to 
have a "sexy office" with visual aids, posters and pictures of the development. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
622, L. 17-24). 
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Mosell Equities paid rent for the Expansion Area/Polo Cove Showroom for a total of 
eight months, the last check dated July 17, 2008. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 674, L. 10 - p. 675, L6: 
Defendant's Exhibit 00.) Mosell made no further payment. At the time of trial, the amount 
owing for the expansion space was $149.255.01 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 632, L. 9). 
When asked about Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, the $20,000 check with "Suite IO I Tls" on the 
memo line, and what relationship that check had with the buy-in of Mosell Equities, Berryhill 
testified: 
Our agreement on the Tls for the expansion space would be that Berryhill would 
pay for part of it, the ballrooms, and Polo Cove would pay for the Polo Cove 
space. And this 20,000 was the Tls for the Polo Cave - Polo Cove Suite 101 
space .... He said that - and we both agreed - that this - the Tls for Polo Cove 
did not go into the buy-in. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 4-17) 
When asked if Mosell ever provided the full amount agreed to complete the buy-in of 
Mosell Equities, Berryhill replied, "He did not" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 6 I 6, L. 18-21 ). 
Berryhill testified that the cost to remodel the restaurant was $100,048.43 and the cost for 
the expansion space was $193,801.29, for a total of $293,849.72 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 688, L. 23 - p. 
690, L. 14; Defendant's Exhibit CCC-I). Mosell did not dispute that the final tenant 
improvements totaled approximately $300,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 327, L. 5-20). Mosell testified that 
the original estimate for Tis to the downtown location was only $50,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 346, L. 
18 - p. 34 7, L. 6; Plaintiff's Exhibit 19) ( emphasis added). 
James Tomlinson also testified that under the terms of the lease for Plaza 121, the only 
items that could be removed at the termination of the lease would be "tables and chairs, 
effectively moveable equipment." He also referenced paragraph 12 of the lease: "All 
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alterations, additions and improvements. except fixtures which shall not become part of the 
building, shall remain in and be surrendered with the premises as a part thereof at the termination 
of this lease" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 889, L. 2-24; Defendant's Exhibit G). Thus, the bulk of the funds 
provided by Mosell Equities went to tenant improvements of the restaurant and "expansion 
space," which will remain with the building at the expiration of any lease. 
At the same time Mosell stopped paying rent on the Polo Cove showroom, he began to 
address the subject of the contributions made by Mosell Equities. At first he indicated that he 
"would like to look at owning fewer shares and getting some cash back" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 324, LI. 
10-12). 
In a subsequent email to Berryhill dated September 9, 2008, Mosell wrote: "John ... We 
need to get together to talk about my investment/divestment in Berryhill and 'lease' ... Let me 
know when you're available ... (Tr., Vol. I, p. 414, LI. 10-15; Defendant's Exhibit MMM, p. 3). 
On October 6, 2008, Mosell again wrote, "John ... I think it's time to discuss our positions again .. 
When are you available this week ... I'd also like to go over my capital contributions with John ... 
Thanks ... Glenn" (Tr. Vol. I., p. 415, L. 25 - p. 416, L. 12; Plaintiffs Exhibit 38). 
In none of these communications did Mosell refer to the transactions as a "loan." 
Whether the parties intended Exhibit 1 to constitute an actual "loan" was obviously 
disputed, a fact Plaintiff will not face. Berryhill testified: 
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I 
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never 
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term 
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter - interim substitute. 
-19-
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 587. LI. 4-9). The attorney working for the pm1ies on the anticipated "buy-in" for 
"MoBerry Venture Corp," Mr. Gourley, testified: 
Q. In that regard, was it ever your understanding, and in conversations with 
Mr. Mosell or Mr. Berryhill, that the transaction was going to take the 
form of a loan from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company? 
A. The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never 
understood that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be 
honest with you, it would be inconsistent with -- with a capital 
contribution into a corporation. And so, I - nobody discussed that with me. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 829, LI. 14-24). 
When testifying about his efforts to develop and market the Polo Cove development, 
Mosell testified: 
Q. Isn't it true that, nevertheless, the value of what you're trying to sell or to 
develop [Polo Cove] was greater because of the Berryhill name? 
A. And that's exactly why I paid $400,000 for half of the business, to use that 
name and to brand the wine country restaurant out there; true. 
Q. And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of 
the Berryhill name? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, LI. 8-16) 
Elsewhere, upon further questioning regarding his desire to have the Berryhill brand as 
part of the Polo Cove development, Mosell testified: 
Q. If you recall, am I correct, Mr. Mosell, that this is the table - the first page, 
the table of contents, of your attorney Todd Lakey's submittal to the 




Q. And again, similar language on page six, if we can flip to it, under 3.2.2, 
restaurant, there's similar language about one of the southwest Idaho's 
most sought after chefs, do you see that? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And it's referred to your attorney, to planning and zoning in Canyon 
County, that he plans to build a centerpiece restaurant at the summit of the 
vineyards; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then, it goes on to talk about John being one of the - also one of the 
most successful and prolific caterers in the state -
A. Yes. 
Q. -- correct? And you agreed with the language in that submission to 
Canyon County, didn't you? 
A. Absolutely. That's why I paid $25,000 for John's consulting work and 
then $400,000 for that branding. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, L. 23 - p. 367, L. 23). 
Thus, at trial, even Plaintiffs own principal, Glenn Mosell, did not consistently refer to 
the check funds as a loan and acknowledged they reflected rather the "buy-in," as well as 
Plaintiffs desire to purchase the Berryhill brand. 
Based on this evidence, as well as that described above, the jury rightly concluded that 
the parties did not intend a loan. Accordingly, there was no breach of a loan contract, because of 
Berryhill & Company's refusal to pay back the funds as if they were a loan. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court acted outside its discretion by granting a new trial based 
on a theory Plaintiff failed to plead or pursue, but rather affirmatively disclaimed. 
2. Whether the trial court acted outside its discretion by granting a new trial based 
on a theory requiring evidence of damages never offered by Plaintiff. 
3. Whether the trial court acted outside its discretion by granting a new trial based 
on a theory upon which Plaintiff submitted no jury instructions. 
4. Whether the trial court acted outside its discretion by granting a new trial based 
on mistaken legal analysis rather than any factor to which its views are accorded 
deference upon appeal. 
5. Whether the trial court acted outside its discretion in its conclusion that a new trial 
could produce a different outcome. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Defendant Berryhill & Company is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to IC. § 12-120(3 ). 
The "gravamen" of Mosell Equities' claim deals with a commercial transaction under Great 
Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 47L 36 P.3d 218,223 (2001). 
Further, Mosell Equities alleges a commercial transaction and claimed entitlement to fees 
pursuant to J.C.§ 12-120(3) in its complaint (R. Vol. I, p. 98, LL 19-22).5 See, Garner v. Povey, 
151 Idaho 462,469,259 P.3d 608,615 (2011). Thus, Defendant should be granted its attorney 
fees, including those on appeal. 
Citations to the original Record in Mosell I are cited to "R." Citations to the Record 
provided in this subsequent appeal are cited to "Supp. R." 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Requisite Standard For New Trial Under Rule 59(a)(6) Requires More 
Than Disagreement With The Verdict. 
According to this Court, in deciding a new trial motion "[t]he judge does not have 
unlimited authority to disturb the verdict of a jury. Respect for the function of the jury prevents 
the granting of a new trial except in unusual circumstances." Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 
603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003), quoting, Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392,394 
( 1992). Under the similar federal rule, "[ w]hat courts cannot do ... and what the district court 
here never purported to do ... is to grant a new trial 'simply because [the court] would have 
come to a different conclusion than the jury did."' Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F .3d 573, 577 ( 5th 
Cir. Tex. 1998), quoting, 25 Fed. Proc., L. Ed.§ 58.13 (1984); see also, Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 
310, 314 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that jury's verdict should be accorded greater deference under 
Rule 59 in cases involving simple issues with highly disputed facts, than in cases involving 
complex issues with facts that are not as disputed). 
Under Rule 59(a)(6), I.R.C.P., the trial court must "determine (1) whether the verdict is 
against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would 
produce a different result." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741,751,274 P.3d 1256, 1266 
(2012) (emphasis added), quoting, Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 
Idaho 826,833, 136 P.3d 297,304 (2006); see also, Hudelson v. Delta Int'! Jvfach Corp., 142 
Idaho 244, 248, 127 P .3d 14 7, 151 (2005); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 3 73, 3 78, 788 P .2d 188, 
193 (1990). 
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Recently, this Court explained its review of a district court's decision under Rule 59: 
This Court's test to determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion 
consists of three parts: '(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.' 
Schmechel v. Dille, MD., 148 Idaho 176, 179, 219 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009) 
(quoting Dyet v. kfcKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529-30, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 
(2003)). 
Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 Idaho 866, 869-870(2013). This Court has also insisted that any 
motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence must "set forth the factual grounds 
therefor with particularity." Rule 59(a)(7), I.R.C.P; Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,430, 
196 P.3d 341,348 (2008). 
In Johannsen, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a district court's denial of a motion for 
new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) in a case involving alleged breach of contract and dissolution 
of an limited liability company. In so doing, the Court quoted with approval the district court's 
analysis: 
Here the district court judge stated, 'I exercise my discretion and can only grant 
this motion if I'm convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of 
the evidence ... ' He continued,' ... it was a good trial, a good issue, and the jury 
decided it one way. They could have gone the other way, but they went the way 
they did and found no breach of contract.' 
146 Idaho at 430. See, also, O'Shea v. High Afark Dev., LLC, 280 P.3d 146, 157-158 (2012) 
(approving denial of motion for new trial where district court found that, while it may not 
necessarily agree with the jury verdict, it did not find that it was against the clear weight of the 
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evidence). Accordingly; the ··clear weighf' standard requires more than disagreement with the 
verdict. 
As the Supreme Court noted in the appeal of this case, "[t]o grant a new trial, the judge 
must also conclude that a different result would follow a retrial.'' }vfosell Equities, LLC v. 
Berryhill & Co., Inc. 154 Idaho, 269, 279, 297 P.3d at 242, citing, Heitz v. Carroll, supra, 117 
Idaho at 378. It also quoted language from Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg. Med Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 
782, 25 P.3d 88, 95 (2001): "This standard requires more than a mere possibility; there must be a 
probability that a different result would be obtained in a new trial." Id. 
2. The Trial Court Acted Outside The Boundaries Of Its Discretion And 
Contrary To Applicable Legal Standards. 
a. The trial court impermissibly recast Plaintiff's theory of 
recovery. 
Throughout the proceedings below, Plaintiff consistently prosecuted this action on the 
sole theory that Exhibit l described a simple loan transaction and all monies that eventually were 
exchanged likewise constituted a loan. Mosell Equities brought this action upon the exclusive 
theory that the parties intended a loan. At no time in these proceedings has Plaintiff asserted a 
claim for any kind of ownership interest in Defendant, whether based on an express or 
constructive partnership or other potential theory. Defendant proposed no jury instructions based 
on such a theory. In fact, Plaintiff pled and admitted just the opposite: "However, the parties 
never formed MOBERRY and Mosell Equities never acquired its 50% ownership interest in 
Berryhill & Company" (R., Vol. I, p. 98, LI. 8-10). 
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Unfortunately, however, the trial court remade Plaintiffs theory and found that a jury 
finding of "no breach" was against the clear weight of the evidence, because "the proposed buy-
in never happened Berryhill & Company never gave Mosell Equities shares in the proposed 
MoBerry Corporation or the established Berryhill & Company." (Supp. R., p. 106). As the trial 
court explained at the hearing, 
And that's why I said, hindsight, I should have asked. Was there a loan 
agreement? Was there a buy-in agreement? Was there a branding argument? 
And if you answered to any of the above, answer the next question. Was the loan 
agreement breached? Was the buy-in agreement breached? And there might be 
others. Those are just the three I can think of right now. 
And then if you answered yes to any of these questions, answer there [sic] next 
question. How much damage, a dollar amount. How much damage in a dollar 
amount? 
(Supp. Tr., pp. 79-80; 11. 18-25; 1-3). 
In Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 376, 788 P.2d 188 (1990), this Court made clear that 
"[t]his Court has long recognized that 'the parties to an action are bound by the theory on which 
they try it,"' citing, Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 766, 776, 
22 P.2d 147, 150 (1933); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Wedgwood, 57 Idaho 682,687, 69 P.2d 
128, 129 (1937). A complaint and pleadings must put opposing party on notice of the theory of 
recovery and, if not, then the court will not grant such relief and cannot infer a cause of action. 
See, e.g., Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808 (2010) ("Without a clear and concise 
statement sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the plaintiffs theories of recovery 
that must be defended against, whether in the body of the complaint or in the prayer for relief, it 
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cannot be said that a cause of action was sufficiently pied. Even under the liberal notice pleading 
standard, a complaint must reasonably imply the theory upon which relief is being sought"). 
Additionally, equitable relief cannot be inferred without being properly pied. See. e.g .. 
Herrmann v. Woodell, I 07 Idaho 916, 922 (1985), citing, Shumate v. Robinson, 52 Or.App. 199, 
627 P.2d 1295 (1981) ("Equitable relief should not be invoked to shape a decree which was not 
reasonably contemplated by the parties and which involves a substantial departure from the 
pleadings and legal theories relied upon by the parties"). See also, Anderson v. War Eagle 
Consolidated Mining Co., 8 Idaho 789, 807 ( 1903)(" ... but in the case at bar the facts alleged in 
the complaint do not show that plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief, and the evidence fails to 
establish the issues made by the pleadings. The complaint is drawn upon the theory that the 
remedy is legal, and not equitable.") 
Having pled and tried this case as a claim for damages for breach of a loan agreement, the 
trial court acted outside its discretion in recasting Plaintiff's claim. The only manner by which 
the trial court attempted to deal with this argument was to state that "any express contract" 
between the parties was breached, adding further that the "issue of the scope of the claim Mosell 
Equities actually stated in its Amended Complaint is not currently before this Court." (Supp. R. , 
p. 109). Yet, the question of the subject and scope of Plaintiff's theory was exactly before the 
Court in exercising its discretion to grant a new trial, for it was granting a new trial on a theory 
never pursued by Plaintiff. In so doing, the trial court acted outside its permissible discretion. 
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b. The trial court did not apply accurate legal standards in concluding that 
the remedy for breach of any "buy-in" agreement consisted of the total 
amounts paid by Plaintiff. 
Whether the "buy-in" agreement constituted a joint venture, a pm1nership or a purchase 
of shares, Plaintiffs available remedy was largely equitable, a remedy Plaintiff never sought. 
The trial court's assumption was simply incorrect that Plaintiff could assert a claim for damages 
for the amounts paid and Defendant could "chip away" at the $405,000 asserted based on other 
value Plaintiff received from Defendant. (Supp. Tr., p. 81, I. 1-20). 
The relationship established between Plaintiff and Defendant was arguably a joint 
venture. "A joint adventure is generally a relationship analogous to but not identical with a 
partnership, and is often defined as an association of two or more persons to carry out a single 
business enterprise with the objective ofrealizing a profit." Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356 
(2008), citing, Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 285, 240 P.2d 833, 839 (1952); see also 
Wheaton Equipment Co. v .. Franmar, Inc., et al., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13416, *24-5 (D. Idaho 
2006), citing, Rhodes v. Sunshine Min Co., 113 Idaho 162,742 P.2d 417,421 (Idaho 1987) (''To 
constitute a joint adventure the parties may combine their prope11y, money, effo11s, skill or 
knowledge in some common undertaking, and their contribution in this respect need not be equal 
or of the same character, but there must be some contribution by each joint adventurer of 
something promotive of the enterprise.") 
In characterizing the "loan" as a "buy-in," then the remedy available is in equity and 
requires an accounting. This has been the case in the law for many years. "When dealing with 
partnership or joint venture agreements, the general rule is that the remedy of the complaining 
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partner or co venturer is in equity for an accounting and a settlement of the partnership affairs." 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Povvelson, 288 F. 299, 303-04 (2nd Cir. 1923) ( citations omitted). "We 
have been unable to find any rule established by which, because of the misconduct of a partner, 
his copartner can rescind the agreement of copartnership and recover back his contributions of 
capital unless such misconduct consisted of gross fraud or gross misrepresentation, by which the 
plaintiff has been induced to enter into the copartnership, so that there was fraud in the inception 
of the contract." Id. 
Furthermore, "[u]nder Idaho law, a partnership is defined as an 'association of two or 
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.' IC§ 53-3-101(8). A partnership 
agreement may be 'written, oral, or implied."' Robertson v. 1Uauro, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
91610, *7 (D.Idaho 2013) (citations omitted) (facts supported the existence of an oral partnership 
agreement at will). "Generally, the only action which will lie between partners regarding 
partnership business is an action for an accounting." Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 790 
(1987). "Other actions are premature until the business is wound up and accounts settled. 'This 
rule is based upon the inconvenience to the parties, the fact that equitable relief may be necessary 
to protect the right of the parties, and the notion that only after a balance has been struck can the 
relative rights of the parties be established."' Id. at 791 ( citations omitted). 
Even if it could be said, as the trial court apparently decided upon remand, that the 
transaction contemplated by the parties in this case constituted a simple sale of shares, Plaintiff 
did not have a simple legal claim for $405,000 in damages. Typically, a claim for damages in a 
suit involving breach of contract for the sale of shares involves a computation based on either a 
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1 
conversion or breach of contract theory. See, generally, Scully v. US WAT5(Jnc .. 238 F.3d 497, 
509 (3d Cir. 2001 ). Under a conversion theory, damages are based on lost profits. while under a 
breach of contract theory, they are based on a computation of value as of the date of breach. 
Such damages are calculated by taking the difference between a stock option's exercise price and 
the market price of the same stock at the time of breach. 238 F.3d at 509-510. 
Where, as here, however, when the stock has no market value, its value is not fixed and 
cannot be readily ascertained, the stock cannot be readily obtained otherwise, specific 
performance is the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Floyd v. Segars, 572 F .2d 1018, 1022 ( 5th Cir. 
1978). As noted above, not only did Plaintiff not plead, pursue, or elect this theory, it offered no 
evidence upon which a stock valuation could be based and sought no equitable relief for specific 
performance. 6 In fact, Plaintiff specifically disclaimed such a theory and remedy. 7 Its claim 
was, and remains, that it loaned money and should be repaid. The trial court simply did not 
properly account for these facts when it granted Plaintiffs motion for new trial. The trial court 
acted outside its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a breach of a very different kind of 
agreement. where Plaintiff never pursued such a theory and offered no evidence in support of the 
damage claim it would necessitate. 
6 Neither did Plaintiff submit proposed jury instructions in this regard. For both this 
reason, and the fact that Plaintiff only submitted instructions based on a "loan" theory, Defendant 
continues to assert that Plaintiff waived any such alternative theory. And it was error for the trial 
court to grant a motion for new trial on the basis of a waived alternative theory. 
As the trial court itself observed, "Because I even specifically asked them, are you asking 
to get 50 percent; Berryhill deed over 50 percent of the business? And they said, no; it didn't 
exist." (Supp. Tr., p. 82, 11. 10-13). 
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c. The trial court acted outside its discretion in basing a new trial on 
grounds Plaintiff failed to preserve. 
According to clear authority from this Court, a party may not raise an issue in a motion 
for JNOV or new trial proceeding if that party failed to object to a jury instruction on the same 
issue. This line of authority is based on I.R.C.P. Rule 51 (b ), which states in relevant part: 
No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless 
the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds of the 
objection. 
In Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,203 P.3d 702 (2009), this Court made clear the 
requirement that a party first object to a jury instruction or special verdict form on an issue in 
order to preserve that issue for a motion JNOV. In that case the Appellants complained that the 
interplay between the contract and unjust enrichment claims was legally erroneous. This Court 
found, however, that, having failed to object to the legal error in the instructions, Appellant could 
not raise the issue on a motion for JNOV. Further, the Court found that they had failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal. 146 Idaho at 77 6. 
It is not sufficient for a party to have submitted a pre-trial jury instruction different from 
that given to the jury by the district court. In Jones v. Crawforth, 14 7 Idaho 11, 19-20, 205 P.3d 
660, 668-669 (2009), the appellant B&B submitted a set of proposed jury instructions that 
included a non-party on the special verdict form. At the jury instruction conference, however, 
B&B failed to object to a form of special verdict that omitted the non-party. This Court said: 
"we find that the language in Rule 51 (b) is controlling, and B&B may not assign as error the 
failure to include Haemonetics on the special verdict fom1 when it did not distinctly object to the 
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exclusion ofHaemonetics from the form.'' 147 Idaho at 20. B&B did not raise the issue again 
until consideration of its motion for JNOV. Doing so did not preserve the issue for appeal. 147 
Idaho at 20. 
In the recent case of St. Alphonsus Divers(fied Care, Inc. v. AfRI Assocs .. LLP, 148 Idaho 
479,224 P.3d 1068 (2009), this Court also made clear that the same rule applies whether the 
instruction deals with an alleged error of law or an issue of fact: 
St. Alphonsus argues, 'Saint Alphonsus also renewed this argument post-trial, 
explaining that "[ a ]s a matter of law, the MRIA partnership was not a partnership 
for a term, and it was an error in law to submit this issue to the jury."' It is too 
late to raise an alleged error in the jury instructions in a post-trial motion for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
148 Idaho at 491, citing, Bates v. Seldin, supra, 146 Idaho at 775-76. See also, Coombs v. 
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,137,219 P.3d 453,461 (2009), "a court does not have the power to 
amend the record to 'correct a judicial error,"' citing, Donaldson v. Henry, 63 Idaho 467,473, 
121 P.2d445,447(1941)). 
Here, as in Jones v. Craw.forth, supra, Plaintiff submitted jury instructions and a 
proposed form of special verdict indicating that, although Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 constituted a 
contract, it was ambiguous (R., Vol I., pp. 1026-1027, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1060-1064). The trial 
court gave both parties the chance to place on the record any objections, proposed changes, 
additions or deletions to the jury instructions and the form of verdict (Tr., p. 919, Ll.16-22). 
When afforded an opportunity to object to the jury instructions and special verdict actually given 
by the trial court to the jury, however, Mosell Equities' counsel indicated instead: 
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... we used to object to all of the the defendant's proposed instructions, we used 
to object to all of the proposed instructions that we presented that weren't given, 
and then we were supposed to object to all of the - all of the proposed instructions 
that were given. 
But I like all of our instructions, so I'm not going to object to the Court's 
instructions. 
That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 919, L. 25 - p. 920, LI. 1-8). Accordingly, the trial court cannot now conclude that 
Exhibit 1 unambiguously effected a ''buy-in" in ordering a new trial, when Plaintiff submitted 
jury instructions to the contrary and failed to object to instructions deeming Exhibit I 
ambiguous. As this Court stated in Mosell I, "because Mosell Equities did not object to the jury 
instructions, it could not even be granted a new trial based upon an alleged error in them." 
1vfosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc. 154 Idaho, 269, 277, 297 P.3d at 240. 
Moreover, in Plaintiffs own proposed jury instructions regarding its breach of an express 
contract claim, Plaintiff proposed the jury be asked: 
Regarding the contract (Plaintiffs Exhibit [l]) did the parties intend the money 
Mosell Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan? 
*** 
Regarding the contract (plaintiffs Exhibit [ 1]) did the parties intend the money 
Mosell Equities provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell 
Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by the parties? 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 1169-70). 
As noted above, at no time did Plaintiff plead or pursue a theory based on anything other than a 
loan. It offered no jury instructions based on breach of a "buy-in" agreement or a sale of stock 
')') 
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agreement. Instead, it consistently asserted breach of a loan agreement and submitted jury 
instructions consistent only with that one theory. In ruling that a new trial should be ordered on 
the basis that the agreement between the parties constituted anything other than a loan 
transaction, the trial court acted outside its discretion in ignoring the application of the "invited 
error" doctrine. See, e.g., Woodburn v. 1'.Janco Prods., 137 Idaho 502, 505, 50 P.3d 997, 1000 
(2002) ("The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give an instruction from later challenging 
that decision on appeal") ( citations omitted). 
d. The trial court acted outside its discretion in concluding that there is a 
probability that a new trial would produce a different outcome. 
The trial court likewise acted outside the boundaries of its discretion in concluding that a 
new jury will find "contrary to the first jury by finding an express contract that Berryhill & 
Company breached by failing to perform [presumably transfer shares] within a reasonable period 
of time." (Supp. R., p. 19). The unavoidable fact is that Plaintiff was a developer involved in a 
very speculative development. He was an economics major and ultimately obtained his Series 6 
license, working as an investment broker (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L. 1 ). Despite his extensive real 
estate and financial experience, he never presented Berryhill with a note or any other documents 
relating to any purported "loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 593, L. 21 ). For his part, Berryhill testified that 
he had no legal or accounting training (Tr., Vol. I, p. 585, L. 9-13). As Certified Public 
Accountant, Amy Dempsey testified, she expected Mosell to characterize the funds for her, since 
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they constituted his funds, but he failed to do so. None of these key facts are going to change at 
a subsequent trial. 
Below, Plaintiff attempted to argue that at a new trial the jury "will be instructed there 
was an express contract, so a different verdict is undeniable" (Supp. R., p. 33). Even if Judge 
Williamson had granted summary judgment that Exhibit 1 represented an express contract, as 
this Court found she did not, ·'because Masell Equities did not object to the jury instructions, it 
could not even be granted a new trial based upon an alleged error in them." A-fosell Equities, 
LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc. 154 Idaho, 269,277,297 P.3d at 240, citing, Saint Alphonsus 
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MR/Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,491,224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). 
Accordingly, the trial court was divested of the authority to order a new trial based on its view 
that Exhibit 1 constituted an express contract, because of Plaintiff's failure to preserve the issue. 8 
Perhaps recognizing that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue, the trial court simply 
asserts without elaboration that the jury "on retrial will find contrary to the first jury by finding 
an express contract that Berryhill & Company breached by failing to perform within a reasonable 
time." (Supp. R. at 107). Presumably, the trial court is referring to its new theory of Plaintiff's 
case - that Berryhill & Company breached by failing to provide shares to Plaintiff. Without 
8 Plaintiff has also argued that this Court would not have remanded had it not thought there 
was a basis upon which this Court could grant a new trial motion. This is erroneous. The 
findings to support a new trial were simply not in the record before this Court, since the trial 
court considered that its decision on JNOV rendered Plaintiff's motion for new trial moot. It was 
possible that the trial court could have based its ruling for a new trial on such factors as witness 
credibility, which it did not, and this Court would be reviewing a very different ruling. 
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more, such a bald assertion does not fulfill the trial com1' s obligation to '·find" that a different 
result would occur. 
Thus, the trial court provides no adequate basis upon which to support its conclusion that 
a new trial would produce a different outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court's Order Granting New Trial and remand to the trial court to 
enter judgment based upon the jury's special verdict at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This of January, 2014. 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellant 
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